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I.

INTRODUCTION

Foreign blocking statutes are considered a thorn in the side of U.S.
discovery in transnational cases. These laws forbid the disclosure of
evidence sought under U.S. rules of federal procedure.' A further
complication for discovery arises from the combination of two more
recent phenomena in American law. The first is the presumption against
extraterritoriality as expressed in Morrison v. National Australia Bank
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. I thank the organizers of the symposium
on discovery at the University of Akron Law School for inviting me to participate and to contribute
my thoughts in written form, particularly Calleigh Olson and Danielle Schantz. Sincere thanks also
to Manon Troin and lnds Soumhi for their able research assistance. Unless otherwise noted,
translations are mine.
1. See, e.g., 3 Louis B. Kimmelman & Steven L. Smith, LitigatingInternationalDisputes in
FederalCourts § 21:97 (4th ed. 2017).
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Ltd.2 (and as further elaborated by the U.S. Supreme Court in several
subsequent cases),3 in conjunction with the Supreme Court's growing
attention to international comity in the same case law.4 The second
complication is the growth of transnational digital discovery.
Judicial discovery tools function in terms of territoriality concepts
because they depend on the territorially-defined jurisdictional powers of
the courts.6 Over many decades, the transnationalization of law has been
a story of deterritorialization, but nowhere is this truer than where digital
data is at issue: the cloud cannot be localized, but precedents oblige parties
to argue in terms of the national territory in which data is localized, as
though all data were tangible.' Most recently, the Supreme Court
considered the case of United States v. Microsoft Corp.,' which might
have enabled a ruling better adapted to digital data than we currently have.
Congress enacted legislation intended to regulate the issue after the Court
had granted certiorari,' and the Court then held the controversy moot.o
Legal transnationalization has resulted from increased mobility and
encounter, " which at the judicial level in turn creates increased awareness
both here and abroad of foreign legal conceptions and perceptions. The

2. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
3. E.g., J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
4. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 108. It has been pointed out that the modem presumption against
extraterritoriality is itself partially based on international comity. William S. Dodge, International
Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2079-80 (2015).

5.

See infra Section IV.

6.

See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality and the Resolution of Jurisdictional

Conflict, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631 (2009) (calling into question the validity of this basis in a globalized
world).
7. One scholar argues that to think about "global law" one must stop thinking about legal
norms in any traditional sense-namely, that the transnationalization of the global necessitates a more
profound shift in our benchmarks. See Benoit Frydman, Comment penser le droit global?, Working

Paper
du
Centre
Perelman
de
Philosophie
du
Droit,
http://www.philodroit.be/IMG/pdf/comment-penserle-droitglobal201 I.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XSC6-RJRX] (last visited May 23, 2018).
8. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
9. See infra Section IV for more on this legislation, known as the CLOUD Act, 115 Pub. L.
No. 141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018). It was enacted on March 23, 2018 and signed into law as part of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act 2018, 115 Pub. L. 141. This legislation provides, inter alia, an
amendment to the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 ("SCA"), the statute at issue in
Microsoft Corp.

10.

Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1186.

11. See Benoit Frydman, Les defis du droitglobal, in LES DEFIS DU DROIT GLOBAL 20 (Benoit
Frydman
&
Caroline
Bricteux
eds.,
2018);
TRANSNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE
AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004); JEAN-SYLVESTRE BERGE & GENEVIEVE
HELLERINGER, OPERATING LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: COMPARING, COMBINING AND
PRIORITISING (2017); ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, GLOBALIZATION: THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES (1998).
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United States, however, unlike its European counterparts, retains a long
and entrenched tradition of requiring judges to refrain from engaging in
comparative legal analysis.1 2 One of the most enlightened opinions in
international discovery analysis, by Judge Friendly, resulted from
ignoring that tradition. " The resistance to analyzing foreign law continues
despite Judge Friendly's example, under the strong force of stare decisis,
a fortiori since the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the principle in Intel
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 14
Foreign blocking statutes are also commonly raised as an objection
where a foreign litigant or other interested person petitions a U.S. court
for U.S.-style discovery in its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1782." The
discussion below will analyze blocking statutes and § 1782 petitions
as they interface with U.S. discovery. It then will address how
concepts developed for tangible documents located in identifiable
places are being applied to digitized data on the cloud. Cloud issues
epitomize law's globalization or transnationalization, as they are the
ultimate illustration of the deterritorialization with which law, a field
defined by territory, is faced today.
II. U.S.

A.

DISCOVERY AND THE FOREIGN BLOCKING STATUTE

Background

The first U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with a foreign blocking
statute was Societd Internationale Pour ParticipationsIndustrielles et
Commerciales, S. A. v. Rogers.16 The case involved two Swiss laws,
including Switzerland's blocking statute concerning banking information.
The Court deferred to the blocking statute, persuaded by evidence of the
Swiss company's good-faith efforts to comply with U.S. discovery, its
lack of collusion with the Swiss government to thwart discovery, as well
as the severity of the criminal law penalties it risked incurring if it violated
the banking secrecy statute by complying with U.S. discovery.' 7
Rogers set the standard for the criteria that U.S. courts have
continued to follow in analyzing foreign blocking statutes' appropriate
12. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004) (drawing on
an already long-established tradition in federal appellate courts).
13. In re Letters Rogatory Issued by Director of Inspection of Government of India, 385 F.2d
1017, 1020 (1967).
14. 542 U.S. at 243.
15. See infra Section Ill.
16. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
17. Id.at208,211.
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effect on discovery requests, although the Supreme Court later
supplemented other factors to consider." More specifically, U.S. courts
deny discovery requests where the defense of a foreign blocking statute
can persuade the court that the law will be enforced by the foreign state
against the objecting party, and that the objecting party risks serious
penalties, especially criminal, by violating it. Thus, in 2014, in Motorola
Credit Corp. v. Uzan,19 the Southern District of New York allowed
discovery to proceed in the face of objections raised on the basis of
French, Jordanian, and Emirati blocking statutes, which forbade the
disclosure of the relevant evidence under criminal penalty of law, but,
tellingly, not against the Swiss bank party. The court reasoned that, "[i]n
contrast with the French situation, Switzerland's bank secrecy regime
constitutes, not just a seriously enforced national interest, but almost an
element of that nation's national identity." 20
Rogers was decided in 1958. At that time and for many years after,
obtaining documents and other evidence beyond national boundaries was
a notoriously slow and difficult process.2 1 Consequently, an international
treaty on evidence gathering in international civil and commercial matters
was concluded in 1970 to facilitate and render the process more efficient
and speedy. 22 This was the Convention on the Taking ofEvidence Abroad
in Civil or CommercialMatters.23 Such a treaty would no doubt have been
infeasible had it permitted discovery in its U.S. form, since the latter is
unique in the world in its breadth and level of intrusiveness. 24 An opt-out
feature therefore was provided so that signatory states could decline to
provide U.S.-style pretrial evidence. According to Article 23 of the Hague
Convention, contracting states may make a declaration that they "will not
execute letters of request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial
discovery of documents as known in common law countries." 2 5 While
some of the 62 signatory states have only partially adopted this opt-out
feature, generally by referring to pretrial "fishing expeditions" as
18.
U.S. 522
19.
20.
21.

See Socit6 Nationale Industrielle A&ospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
(1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
73 F. Supp. 3d 397, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Id. Accord, S.E.C. v. Stanford Int'l Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323, 341 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
See Gary B. Born, The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited: Reflections on Its Role in

U.S. Civil Procedure,57-SUM LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 78 (1994); Vivian Grosswald Curran,
United States Discovery and Foreign Blocking Statutes, 76 LA. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (2016).
22. See Curran, supra note 21; and Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 530-31 (explaining U.S.
objectives in promoting the Hague Convention).

23. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Oct. 7,
1972, 23 U.S.T. 2555 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
24.
25.

This remains the case even after the reforms of 2015. See Curran,supra note 21, at 1147.
Hague Convention, supra note 23, at art. 23.
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unacceptable, there are not many states that have not invoked Article 23
at all. 26
Harkness and his co-authors have noted that "many contracting states
operate on the assumption that the Hague Convention is the only means
for securing [foreign] discovery" among contracting states. 27 What these
authors call an "assumption" is a position many contracting states
espouse, pursuant to which, as far as they are concerned, any discovery
order emanating from a U.S. court that does not come via the Hague
Convention is illegitimate, since the United States is a contracting state.28
To be perfectly clear, it is not an "assumption" arising out of ignorance of
U.S. law, but a legal position.29 They knowingly reject the U.S. view
dating from the Supreme Court holding in Adrospatiale.3 0 In that case, the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded as follows: the Hague Convention was
neither exclusive nor even the preferred first method for obtaining
evidence abroad, and litigants could initiate discovery using the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 3
As the partial concurrence and dissent in Adrospatialepredicted, the
majority's holding presaged the end of the Hague Convention as the
ordinary means for obtaining evidence abroad in civil and commercial
litigation.32 For the litigant, the Federal Rules provide the advantage of
far broader discovery than the typical limitation that the Hague
Convention Article 23 permits.33 For the U.S. judge, as well as litigant,
the Hague Convention has remained an unfamiliar text, while the Federal
Rules have the advantage of being daily fare. 34 As Born and Rutledge

26. See TIMOTHY P. HARKNESS, RAHIM MOLOO, PATRICK OH & CHARLINE YIM, DISCOVERY
IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES 16-17 (2015). For an updated list of those and

all contracting states, see 20: Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-

table/?cid=82 [https://perma.cc/RVK8-8G3L] (last visited Mar. 6, 2018) (table
applicability of arts. 15, 16, 17, 18 and 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention).

reflecting

27.

HARKNESS et al., supra note 26, at I1.

28.

See Daniel Barlow, Premiere applicationpinale de la loi de blocage de 1968, Note sous

Cour de cassation (crim.) 12 decembre 2007, 2008 REVUE DES SOCIETES 882, para. 13 (2008).

29. See, e.g., Knight Capital Partners Corp. v. Henkel AG & Co., 290 F. Supp. 3d 681 (E.D.
Mich. 2017).
30. Societe Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 548 (1987).
31. Id.
32. Id. ("Experience to date indicates that there is a large risk that the case-by-case comity
analysis now to be permitted by the Court will be performed inadequately and that the somewhat

unfamiliar procedures of the Convention will be invoked infrequently.").
33. See, e.g., Connex R.R. LLC v. AXA Corporate Solutions Assurance, No. CV 16-02368ODW (RAOx), 2017 WL 3433542, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017).
34. See Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 548.
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have suggested, the net effect of Adrospatiale has been to place more
decision-making power in this area in the hands of district court judges
than in most areas of law involving international issues with foreign
comity concerns because discovery objections tend to arise on motions in
limine and generally are not subject to review at the interlocutory stage.35
While these authors express a concern that the dearth of appellate review
will lead to intercircuit lack of uniformity, another byproduct of that very
paucity has been a greater tendency of courts dealing with blocking
statutes to cite to other circuits as they look for applicable persuasive
appellate authority due to the very absence of much overall authority, thus
paradoxically increasing the likelihood of intercircuit uniformity,36
despite some observable distinctions among circuits. 37
B.

Recent Case Law Analyzing Blocking Statutes

As the Motorola court articulated in 2014, the courts have applied
the standards the Supreme Court set forth in Aerospatiale since 1987.
Since 2013, the courts also look to Republic ofArgentina v. NML Capital,
Ltd., 38 a U.S. Supreme Court case that arose in the context of interpreting
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976." In that case, litigants
were compelled to produce information in discovery despite applicable
blocking laws from Spain, Brazil, Chile, Panama, Bolivia, Paraguay,
Argentina, Uruguay, and the Cayman Islands.4 0 Some of these blocking
laws, invoked as defenses to discovery, were based on bank secrecy
statutes and some even on foreign state constitutions (those of Panama
and Paraguay)."
35. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 1042 (2011).
36. See, e.g., Republic Techs. (NA), LLC v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP, No. 16 C 3401,
2017 WL 4287205, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2017) (Northern District for Illinois citing to Southern
District of New York); Connex R.R., 2017 WL 3433542, at *14 (Central District of California citing
to two Eastern District of New York cases and two other New York district courts); Strauss v. Credit

Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (Eastern District of New York citing to the
Seventh Circuit).

37. My research, for example, indicates the Second Circuit as being more likely to rule in favor
of proceeding with Federal Rules discovery in the face of blocking statute defenses than the Seventh
or Eleventh Circuits.

38. 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014).
39. 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1330, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-171).
40. For a discussion of the lower court defenses asserted by Argentina in NML Capital, see
Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 73 F. Supp. 3d 397, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In NML Capital, the
Supreme Court alluded to the defendant's dilatory tactics with respect to discovery, noting that it had
been ten years since the plaintiff had been trying to discover Argentina's assets. NML Capital, 134 S.
Ct. at 2253.
41. NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2253.
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A student note published in 2018 tried to systematize the proportion
of compelled discovery orders where each defense that had been raised of
foreign blocking statutes had involved the potential for both criminal and
civil penalties. The study concluded that the courts compelled Federal
Rules discovery in 37 out of 42 cases. 42
The Supreme Court derived the Adrospatialestandard it continues to
apply from Rogers and what became § 442(1)(c) of the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.43 Since then,
the Restatement (Fourth) has been finalized. In the matters relevant to this
discussion, the Restatement (Fourth) does not materially alter the previous
one. 4 4 Adrospatiale's factors, consistent with the Restatements (Third)
and (Fourth) of Foreign Relations, consider how important the requested
documents are to the litigation; how specific the discovery requests are;
whether the evidence located abroad originated in the United States; if the
party requesting the discovery has other means of obtaining the evidence;
and if the court's deference to the foreign blocking statute would
undermine U.S. "important interests" or, conversely, if, by compelling
discovery, the court would undermine the foreign state's "important
interests."

45

The comity analysis courts have applied underAdrospatiale'sabovelisted last criterion of interest balancing has been closely linked to
studying whether the relevant foreign state actually enforces its blocking
statute, a factor that had been underscored by the Supreme Court three
decades earlier in Rogers when it deferred to Switzerland's bank secrecy
law. By the time of Adrospatiale, when the Supreme Court was deciding
this issue in terms of the French blocking statute, it could rely on the lower
court's holding that France's law did not need to be taken seriously.4 6
After Adrospatiale,the Supreme Court's finding that the French blocking
statute's criminal penalty need not overcome a party's right to conduct
discovery under the Federal Rules became the highest precedent for that
proposition.4 7

42. M.J. Hoda, The Adrospatiale Dilemma: Why US. Courts Ignore Blocking Statutes and
What Foreign States Can Do About It, 106 CAL. L. REV. 231, 234 (2018).
43. The Supreme Court referred in Adrospatiale to the Restatement (Third) § 437, the
predecessor to later § 442.
44. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§

222 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016).
45. Societe Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 544, n.28 (1987).
46. Id. at 527.
47. See, e.g., Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) and
sources cited therein.
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For many years France's statute was not applied, and to date only
four applications have been made. 4 8 French legislative history uncovered
and quoted by a U.S. court even revealed the motive of thwarting U.S.
discovery without the intent to apply the statute, if passed, against French
nationals. 4 9 While this situation lasted for many years, the French
Supreme Court eventually affirmed the application of its blocking
statute.5 o Still, some U.S. courts under the sway of stare decisis continued
to cite to U.S. precedents that predated France's application of its law, for
the outdated proposition that France did not apply the blocking statute.
One such case, decided in 2017, was Republic Technologies (NA), LLC v.
BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP,si in which the court cited to a 1984 case for
the proposition that "[t]he Blocking Statute obviously is a manifestation
of French displeasure with American pretrial procedures. . . . There is no
evidence that France's interest in its blocking statute has changed or that
France has become more vigorous in enforcing its blocking statute in
recent years." 52 The Republic Technologies court also found, in keeping
with precedent, that "the French blocking statute was not aimed at
protecting [the] state, but at merely protecting [French] corporations from
foreign discovery requests." 5 3 In contrast, it described as "vital" the U.S.
interest in "providing a forum for the final resolution of disputes and for
enforcing these judgments," 5 4 concluding with no further analysis that
U.S. interests "outweigh the sovereign interests (ifany) that France has.""
Republic Technologies concerned information in France of the
subsidiary of a U.S. company against whom a motion to compel discovery
had been filed.56 The court granted the motion, holding that the
determinative factor in whether a parent company can be compelled to
produce documents of a subsidiary is if the parent has the "legal right to
obtain them."" Some recent cases acknowledge France's somewhat

48. TGI Nanterre, 22 d6cembre 1993, JurisData no 1993-050136; CA Versailles, 16 mai
2001, JCP E 2007, 2330, Cass. 2e civ., 20 novembre 2003, no 01-15.633; T. com. Paris, Vac., 20
juillet 2005; Cass. crim., 12 d6cembre 2007, no 07-83.228 (ChristopherX).
49. Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. SS Seatrain Bennington, Nos. 80 Civ. 1911 (PNL), 82 Civ. 0375
(PNL), 1984 WL 423 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1984).
50. ChristopherX, supra note 48.
51. Republic Techs. (NA), LLC v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP, No. 16 C 3401, 2017 WL
4287205 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2017).
52. Id. at *4 (quoting in part a 1984 case that predated the French Supreme Court's enforcement
of its blocking statute, Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 508 (N.D. 111. 1984)).
53. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Id.
55. Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at *1.
57. Id. at *2.
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belated applications of its blocking statute under the pressure of copies of
translated French decisions and other documents filed with U.S. district
courts.58 Yet, on the whole, while the non-enforcement of the statute
figured heavily as a reason against deferring to it, the fact of its occasional
enforcement does not mean that U.S. courts are deferring to it now.
Thus, in another 2017 case, Connex RailroadLLC v. AXA Corporate
Solutions Assurance," the French Ministry of Justice wrote a letter to
signal the potential criminal liability France's blocking statute would
subject the French defendant company.60 The court accepted this as
signifying that the statute applied to the defendant.' It also found that the
documents that formed the object of the discovery probably originated in
France, not the United States (one of the Aerospatiale factors militating
against Federal Rules discovery). 62 Here, the court even found that the
defendant's agreement to comply with the Hague Convention's expedited
procedure seemed to make the latter a viable alternative means for
plaintiff to obtain the documents, 63 but it reasoned that the Hague
Convention's "effectiveness" had been questioned.64 The court noted that
the Hague Convention provides a narrower scope of discovery than the
Federal Rules and that, therefore, it could not be said necessarily to
constitute a truly viable alternative means to Federal Rules discovery.65
Finally, despite taking judicial note of the French Supreme Court
(Cour de cassation) case applying the blocking statute, the court stated
that this example, even when combined with the French Ministry of
Justice's declaration of criminal vulnerability of the French defendant,
was insufficient to persuade it that the defendant would run the risk of
criminal prosecution in France if it were compelled to comply with
Federal Rules discovery.66 Citing to U.S. case law that Adrospatialemade
famous concerning the French blocking statute, the California district

58. See, e.g., Connex R.R. LLC v. AXA Corporate Solutions Assurance, CV 16-02368-ODW
(RAOx), 2017 WL 3433542 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017) (translation of French Supreme Court decision
and letter from French Ministry of Justice); S.E.C. v. Stanford Int'l Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323,
333, n.13 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (citing a law review article about the French enforcement of a blocking
statute); In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, No. 05-

MD-I 720(JG)(JO), 2010 WL 3420517, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010) (Eastern District ofNew York
citing Northern District of California).
59. Connex R.R., 2017 WL 3433542.
60. Id.at*11.
61. Id.
62. Id. at *13.
63. Id. at *14
64. Id.
65. Id. at *14-15.
66. Id. at *17.
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court reasoned that "many [U.S.] courts have discounted that risk [of
criminal prosecution] in the context of the French Blocking Statute, noting
that the Blocking Statute does not subject defendants to a realistic risk of
prosecution." 6 7 It also (correctly) distinguished ChristopherX, the French
criminal law prosecution under France's blocking statute that France's
Supreme Court upheld, because that case had nothing to do with a U.S.
discovery request, but, rather, dealt with a French lawyer who had tried to
get evidence from a French witness for use in a trial in the United States.
It had not involved a dispute around the Hague Evidence Convention and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This is indeed an important distinction that diminishes the utility of
the case to the discovery context.6 8 Where it might continue to be seen as
having some traction is that one can deduce from the ChristopherX case
the depth to which a core value of the French legal system had been
undermined by a lawyer's approaching a witness directly, where in France
such actions are for judges alone to do. Similarly, U.S. pretrial discovery's
perceived prying and intrusiveness offend deep values in France of
privacy,6 9 just as U.S. evidence-taking conducted in France offends
l'ordrepublic (fundamental values) inasmuch as only judges may do so
in France.70
The latest French development with respect to its blocking statute
has been to pass a new law, la loi Sapin II,71 to apply the blocking statute
more vigorously. In addition to la loi Sapin I's strengthening the French
blocking statute, the Executive Branch of the French government has
created a new position to oversee the enforcement of the French blocking
statute.72 Meanwhile, the latest development in the United States is a case
in which the federal district court did not compel U.S. discovery under the

67.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

68.

The court did not require that plaintiff proceed under the Hague Convention. Id. at *19.

69. See infra discussion of Henry Zoch II v. Daimler, A.G., No. 4:17-CV-578, 2017 WL
5177959, nn.98-101 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2017) and surrounding text; Curran, supranote 21, at 1147.
70.

See Curran, supra note 21.

71. Art. 2, Loi no 2016-1691 du 9 d6cembre 2016 relative a la transparence, A la lutte contre la
corruption et A la moderisation de la vie 6conomique, JORF no0287 du 10 d6cembre 2016, available
on

Legifrance,

French

government

site

for

legislation,

https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/

affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000033558528&categorieLienid
B4JD].
72.
et

A la

[https://perma.cc/9XRX-

D6cret no 2016-66 du 29 janvier 2016 instituant un commissaire A l'information strategique
scurit6 6conomiques et portant cr6ation d'un service A comp6tence nationale d6nomm6 <<

service de I'information strat6gique et de la scurit6 6conomiques >>, ORF no0025 du 30 janvier 2016,
available

on

Legifrance,

at

https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/

affichTexte.docidTexte=JORFTEXT000031940456&categorieLienid
D9MY].

[https://perma.cc/4C87-
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Federal Rules where the French defendant raised the French blocking
statute as a defense.7 3
Although in no way referring to or at all recognizing the latest
legislative and executive measures in French law to strengthen the
blocking statute through heightened obligatory enforcement and
oversight, and indeed, once again stating the time-honored principle that
it was not inquiring into French law but simply accepting the statement
concerning French law's penalties from the moving party because the
latter had an experienced and credible French attorney who had spoken to
the issue, 74 the Arizona district court in Salt River ProjectAgricultural
Improvement and Power District v. Trench France SAS ruled that it
would apply the Hague Evidence Convention. In this novel case, the
court concluded that the discovery requests were not necessarily
"narrowly tailored" 76 to the case, further noting that the relevant
documents of the French party were located in France. (The court did not
speak to their place of origination, the criterion the Supreme Court had
held to be the relevant factor in Adrospatiale.)7 7
The court also accepted the moving party's assertion over its
opponent that the information sought was available through the Hague
Convention, noting that the assertions to that effect were made by a French
attorney experienced in Hague Convention practice.78 Most interestingly,
while most U.S. courts have found that France's sovereign interest in
enforcing its blocking statute is outweighed by the U.S. national interest
in protecting plaintiffs' rights and preserving broad-based discovery," the
Arizona court in Salt River Project held otherwise: "Unlike the U.S.
interests, which are unlikely to be impaired if Hague procedures are used,
this French interest [in enforcing its blocking statute] may be impaired if
this Court simply orders discovery."so This decision may be an exception,
or it may be a harbinger of increased deference to foreign blocking statutes
under the sway, among other influences, of heightened attention to

73. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist. v. Trench France SAS, No. CV17-01468-PHX-DGC, 2018 WL 1382529 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2018).
74. Id. at *2 (citing Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1474, n.7
(9th Cir. 1992)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at *3.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Societ6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522 (1987) and its vast progeny.
80. Salt River Project, 2018 WL 1382529, at *4.
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international comity and the presumption against extraterritoriality that
have been gaining ground in recent years."1
As this case demonstrates, despite their reluctance to do so, it has
been impossible for U.S. judges to avoid engaging in comparative law.82
Thus, in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Stanford International
Bank, Ltd.," the district court in Texas stated that, "[a]lthough the Court
is reluctant to interpret Swiss law, the Court finds the [Swiss] expert's
reading accurate." 84 The courts must interpret and understand the foreign
blocking statute if they are to draw the necessary conclusions regarding
the following issues: whether the statute in fact would preclude the
information requested through discovery, whether the laws of the foreign
nation would lead to criminal sanctions, and whether the foreign legal
system does or does not enforce its law.
In a 2017 case involving a German blocking statute concerning data
protection, Knight CapitalPartnersCorp. v. Henkel AG & Co., " the court
once again engaged in some discussion of the foreign law at issue." The
court looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 and to Ninth Circuit
case law to indicate that, "in determining foreign law,"8 7 it could "look to
cases, regulations, treatises, scholarly articles, legislative history, treaties
and other legal materials. . . .""Moreover, in this case in which the court
compelled discovery under the Federal Rules, the court rejected the idea
that it should be guided by the German legal expert in determining the
meaning of German law: "[T]he Court certainly has both the authority and
the duty to construe the meaning of the statute in the first instance,
informed by the ordinary principles of statutory construction and by
reference to the plain language of the statute itself." 89 Since legal experts
in the United States, unlike in Germany and France, are party experts, not
court experts, U.S. judges may be leery of their conclusions.9 0 In this
instance, however, where the court alluded to interpreting German law
according to "ordinary principles of statutory construction," those rules of

81.
(2010).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
Cafetikre,

See Kimmelman & Smith, supra note 1; Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247
See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Stanford Int'l Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 333.
290 F. Supp. 3d 681 (E.D. Mich. 2017).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
On this issue and judicial frustration, see Easterbrook, J., in Bodum USA, Inc. v. La
Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2010).
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construction no doubt refer to ordinary U.S. rules of statutory
construction.
This was not a promising approach to understanding German law.
Rules of statutory construction are different in Germany and France from
those in the United States. Civil-law legal systems originally were built
from the premise that textual, codified law contains all legal solutions and
that judges may not create law.9 1 As a consequence of being text-based,
civil-law legal systems are far more developed in the area of statutory
construction, especially in Germany where canons of construction have
reached a level of exquisite organization.92 The "meaning" of a law, as the
court put it in Knight, may vary substantially as a function of rules of
construction. Others, from the Supreme Court to scholars, have noted the
very real risks of mistakes where judges do engage in foreign or
comparative law analysis.93 A risk of the policy against doing so is to
increase the probability of error where, as is ever more the case in the
globalized world, our courts must, and therefore do, engage in this
process, but are less well prepared to do so than they otherwise might be
if they engaged in comparative law fully and openly through adequate
research and education and perhaps other innovations, such as courtappointed experts. 94
The court in Knight rejected the German "expert's opinion that
discovery is permissible only when conducted on the basis of the Hague
Convention [because it] is flatly contrary to the Supreme Court's decision
in the Adrospatiale case."" The German expert whose opinion the court
summarily dismissed as incorrect was reflecting Germany's official legal
perspective, which is the same as France's.96 Adrospatiale reflected the
depth of U.S. law's commitment to wide discovery as a fundamental right
of litigants in American courts, albeit one that a U.S. court might have a
duty to tailor more narrowly than ordinarily under the Federal Rules

91. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, EnlightenedCivil Law: Legal
Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 93 (2001).

92. See, e.g., James R. Maxeiner, Scalia & Garner'sReadingLaw: A Civil Lawfor the Age of
Statutes?, 6 J. CIv. L. STUD. 1, 16-22 (2013).
93. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 542 U.S. 241, 243 (2004); Hans Smit,
American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28
of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1, 9 (1998).

94. The United States stands virtually alone among western legal systems to reject comparative
law today.
95. Knight Capital Partners Corp. v. Henkel AG & Co., 290 F. Supp. 3d 681, 689 (E.D. Mich.
2017).
96. See id. (noting that many states take this position where information is sought by another
Hague contracting state, rejecting Adrospatiale'sposition as contrary to international law).
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where comity concerns became a consideration.9 7 In proceeding through
the Ae rospatialefactors, the Knight court noted that the German blocking
statute's main objective was "to protect its citizens from [U.S.] discovery
obligations." 9 8 It appeared to base this conclusion solely on a similar
finding by the Eastern District of New York, which, in U.S. domestic
parlance, also is "foreign law" to a Michigan court.
The Knight case can be contrasted with the Eastern District of
Texas's 2017 Henry Zoch IIv. Daimer, A. G. decision." Though that court
similarly granted the plaintiffs motion to compel discovery under the
Federal Rules over a German defendant's objections, it did find that
"Germany has a weighty national interest in protecting personal
data. . . ."o The court was aware that Germany had not just enacted a
statute but that the government had filed an amicus brief in a different case
to declare the importance of privacy interests in Germany, and that the
value of privacy is so fundamental to German law and society that it also
is enshrined in Germany's constitution."oi None of this ultimately
persuaded the court to deny plaintiff's motion to compel discovery, where
it found, under the Adrospatialecriteria, that (1) the requested information
was important to the litigation; (2) the plaintiff had made specific, welltailored requests for information, even though (3) the information did not
originate in the United States, but where the court also found that (4) the
plaintiff had no alternate means to acquire it, presumably precisely due to
the privacy rights blocking law; and where (5) Germany's weighty interest
in protecting its citizens' privacy interests was counterbalanced by the
United States' "substantial interest in vindicating the rights of American
plaintiffs and adjudicating matters before its courts."102
A different result has been obtained where objections to discovery
arose on the part of the European Commission (EC) purely on the basis of
comity, however, with no assertion of a formal blocking statute. Blocking
statute cases at first blush would seem to have the stronger claim to
success in defeating Federal Rules discovery, given that objections based
on them are founded on the potential for criminal penalties by the party
97.
U.S. 522,
98.
99.
2017).
100.

Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A&rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
545-46 (1987).
Knight, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 691.
Henry Zoch II v. Daimler, A.G., No. 4:17-CV-578, 2017 WL 5177959 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 8,
Id. at *6.

101. Id. Privacy interests are perceived differently in both Germany and France from the United
States. National memory of the Nazi years has been a strong influence on the protection of personal
data in both European states.

102.

Zoch, 2017 WL 5177959, at *5-6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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raising a foreign blocking statute as a defense. Consequently, in those
cases, courts inquire into the foreign state's habits of enforcement or, as a
corollary mode of inquiry, into the defendant's motives: sincere attempts
to comply with U.S. discovery or, on the contrary, an attempt to make use
of the foreign national's blocking statute precisely to circumvent the
discovery request. 103
The pure comity cases have involved the EC where its own prior anticompetition litigation was concerned. 104 Courts have declined to compel
Federal Rules discovery where the information sought was in a
subsequent U.S. antitrust case. 10 This occurred in Payment Interchange
Fee, where the defendant had submitted redacted documents the plaintiff
had requested from EC litigation, and had asked the EC if it was permitted
to reveal more in order to comply with the discovery requests. 1' The EC
had refused, submitting its objections to the court. 07 The court noted how
intimately linked to other litigation the requested information was and that
the documents had originated in Europe, not the United States.10 ' It found
persuasive that the privacy rights the EC proceedings accorded to parties
were of grave importance to the EC, notably in ensuring that future
investigations were not held under the specter of the abrogation of parties'
privacy by potential U.S. Federal Rules discovery if a U.S. case were to
follow at a later date.1 0 9
The court held that the U.S. plaintiffs right to discovery was
outweighed by the EC's "interest in confidentiality [because the latter]
plays a significant role in assisting the effective enforcement of European
antitrust law.""o This case, as many others, heeded the Ninth Circuit
assessment in Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants,"' that the
Aerospatiale comity factor of balancing national interests is the
weightiest. Both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have also indicated that
courts will deny motions to compel discovery if "the outcome of the [U.S.]

103. See, e.g., Soci6t6 Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S. A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
104. See In re Payment Interchange Fee, No. 05-MD-1720) (JG)(JO), 2010 WL 3420517 (E.D.
N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010); In re Rubber Chemicals, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
105. See In re Payment, 2010 WL 3420517.
106. See id. at *3.
107. See id.
108. Id. at *9.
109. See id.; In re Rubber, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1080, n.1, 1083 (noting that participants in the
EC's Leniency Program received leniency if they confessed to anti-competitive conduct and need to
preserve privacy of participants for continued functioning of program).
110. In re Payment, 2010 WL 3420517, at *9.
111. 959 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992).
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litigation does not stand or fall on the present discovery order." 1 l2 The
comity cases, which yield rulings against Federal Rules discovery even in
the absence of blocking statutes, may signal a shift towards taking
blocking statutes more seriously because of international comity
concerns. Such a shift will have to overcome the long tradition of placing
great weight on the U.S. courts' vindicating the rights of parties to Federal
Rules discovery. 113
III. SECTION 1782 PETITIONS

A.

Background

U.S. courts' preference for discovery under the Federal Rules reflects
their deep respect for the plaintiffs right to access discovery. Discovery
has gained the stature of a constitutional or quasi-constitutional right.114
A strong interest of the United States is the vindication of U.S. plaintiffs'
rights and providing a forum to adjudicate their claims. Under § 1782,
U.S. courts have also in general shown a great inclination to honor the
petitions for U.S.-style discovery, only here the petitioners are not U.S.
parties, but foreign litigants, courts, and other interested persons, and the
information they request is for use in foreign litigation occurring in
another nation.
The section reads in relevant part as follows:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found
may order him to give testimony or statement or to produce a document
or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal. The order may be made pursuant to . .. the application of any
interested person [and] . .. [t]o the extent that the order does not
prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the
document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.115
Section 1782 is designed to allow U.S. courts to provide assistance in
foreign litigation.' 1 6 In these cases, a U.S. court in its discretion is
112. Id. (citing In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 999
(10th Cir. 1977)); accord In re Rubber, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1078; Fenerjian v. Nong Shim Co., Ltd.,
No. 13-cv-04115-WHO (DMR), 2016 WL 245263 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2016).
113.

See Curran,supra note 21, at 1141, and sources cited therein.

114. Id.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1964).
116. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 249 (2004) (citing S. REP.
NO. 1580, at 7-8 (1964)); Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995) ("We
have . . .noted that Congress purposefully engineered section 1782 as a one-way street. It grants wide
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agreeing to assist a foreigner in obtaining information that will be
produced within the U.S. court's jurisdiction, and to do this despite the
fact that the information sought would generally not be discoverable in
the foreign forum in which the litigation is taking place.'1
The only § 1782 case to have been adjudicated by the U.S. Supreme
Court to date is Intel. The principal issue in that case was whether the
executive branch of the European Union, the EC, could constitute a
"tribunal" within the meaning of § 1782, despite the EC itself having
argued to the contrary. 1 s Intel set the standard for § 1782 petitions in
several ways since it was decided in 2004. In particular, since Intel, even
where the petitioner is an individual foreign litigant, a defense that the
information sought is not discoverable in the foreign forum litigation is
not a bar to discovery.1 19 According to the Restatement (Fourth), § 1782
"is not limited to information the production of which the foreign or
international tribunal could order, or that would be admissible in the
foreign or international proceeding." 1 20 Moreover, whereas at one time the
location of the documents sought was a relevant criterion, "[ijn the
contemporary world, where documents exist mostly in virtual form, and
may be accessed from many locations, territorial location may become
less relevant." 1 2 1
The Restatement (Fourth) departs from its last two predecessors in
shifting the legal theory for decisions to enforce § 1782 discovery
obligations from international law (as was the case in Restatement
(Second) § 40 and Restatement (Third) §§ 441, 442) to principles of
international comity: "Current state practice does not support the claim
that the defense of foreign-state compulsion rests on international law.
Rather, the defense reflects the practice of states in the interest of
comity."1 22

A seminal case in § 1782 law that dates from 1995123 established
several principles that have continued to characterize judicial rulings: (1)
it may be reversible error to deny a § 1782 petition on the basis that the
discovery requested would be unavailable to the foreign legal system in

assistance to others, but demands nothing in retum.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

117.
118.
119.

See Intel, 542 U.S. at 241.
The Court held it was a tribunal for purposes of § 1782. Id. at 242-43.
See id. at 243-44.

120.

RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 306

(Reporter's Note 3, 2016) (emphasis added).
121. Id., Reporter's Note 7 (citing In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled
and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)).
122. Id., Reporter's Note 9.
123. Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995).
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whose forum the litigation takes place;124 (2) U.S. courts may not impose
a "quasi-exhaustion" requirement on § 1782 petitioners, in the sense that
a petition need not be preceded by the petitioner's attempt to obtain the
information in the forum jurisdiction; 12 5 and (3) U.S. judges should not
attempt to understand the foreign law or legal system of the foreign
forum.126 At that time an intercircuit split divided jurisdictions'
perspectives on the relevance of foreign discoverability to § 1782
petitions. 127
In 2004, however, the Supreme Court formally rejected the criterion
of discoverability in the foreign forum as contrary to the statute: "While
[concerns of] comity and parity [among litigants] may be important
touchstones for a district court's exercise of discretion in particular cases,
they do not permit our insertion of a generally applicable foreigndiscoverability rule into the text of§ 1782(a)."l 28 The Supreme Court also
underscored a third criterion in Intel: "Section 1782 .. . does not direct
United States courts to engage in comparative analysis to determine
whether analogous proceedings exist ... Comparisons of that order can
be fraught with danger."l 29 The Court added in a footnote that the
"comparison of systems is slippery business." 3 0
Justice Ginsburg was quite right that the dangers of error are very
real when comparing legal systems, yet comparison is necessary because
it is inevitable. Thus, Justice Breyer dissented in Intel in part because of
the majority's denial of foreign law's relevance."' One might wonder
how international comity and parity among parties litigating in a foreign
system can have any meaning, as the majority in Intel nevertheless
suggested they might, if that system, its proceedings, and laws are not to
play any role in the exercise of discretion by federal district courts in §
1782 cases.
Following in the footsteps of Esmerian, the Second Circuit in In re
Application for an Order Permitting Metallgesellschaft AG to take
Discovery, dealing this time with German rather than French pending

124. Id. at 1098.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1099; Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 243 (2004).
127. See, e.g., Eleventh and First Circuits, with cases noted in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Jacobs in Esmerian, 51 F.3d at 1103 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (noting also that the majority in that case
had taken the leap from permitting the district courts of the Second Circuit to allow discovery under

§

1782 despite non-discoverability in the foreign jurisdiction, to requiringthem to do so).
128. Intel, 542 U.S. at 243.
129. Id.
130. Id. at n.15.
131. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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litigation, reversed a district court denial of a § 1782 petition.' 3 2 The lower
court relied on precedents for the proposition that foreign discoverability
could be "a useful tool in the exercise of [the district court's] discretion" 3 3
in § 1782 cases. According to the Second Circuit, however, "this language
was not meant to authorize denial of discovery pursuant to § 1782 solely
because such discovery is unavailable in the foreign court, but simply to
allow consideration of foreign discoverability (along with many other
factors) when it might otherwise be relevant to the §1782 application."134
The court also made clear that if approving the application would create
inequality by favoring the § 1782 applicant entitled to U.S.-style
discovery, the remedy still would not be to deny the § 1782 petition, but,
rather, to issue a discovery order that was narrower than it might otherwise
be, and more "tailored" to the petitioner's needs, in light of the disparity
of means that would result from the respondent's not having access to
equivalent discovery in the ongoing foreign litigation.135
B.

ComparativeLegal Analysis

The case against comparative legal analysis under § 1782 was made
by one of the principal drafters of the section's 1964 amendments, Hans
Smit, a comparatist himself and former colleague of Justice Ginsburg at
Columbia Law School:1 36
[T]he drafters realized that making the extension of American assistance
dependent on foreign law would open a veritable Pandora's box. They
definitely did not want to have a request for cooperation turn into an
unduly expensive and time-consuming fight about foreign law. That
would be quite contrary to what was sought to be achieved. They also
realized that, although civil law countries do not have discovery rules
similar to those of common law countries, they often do have quite
different procedures for discovering information that could not properly
be evaluated without a rather broad understanding of the subtleties of
the applicable foreign system. It would, they judged, be wholly
inappropriate for an American district court to try to obtain this
understanding for the purpose of honoring a simple request for
assistance. 137

132.
133.
134.
135.

121 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id. at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 80.

136.

See Hans Smit, InternationalLitigation underthe UnitedStates Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV.

1015, n.al (1965).
137. Hans Smit, Recent Developments in InternationalLitigation, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 215, 235
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Yet even Professor Smit criticized the Second Circuit when it did
not apply the Spanish law's understanding of privileges to § 1782(a)'s
last sentence, shielding from production information subject to "any
legally applicable privilege."'3 8 instead, the court had applied the U.S.
attorney-client privilege.'3 9 He argued that Spanish law should have
been applied under a conflicts of law approach that the case called
for.1 4 0 In an early article written after the 1964 amendments to § 1782
had been drafted, Professor Smit explained as follows:
The reference in new Section 1782(a) to "any legally applicable
privilege" is not restricted to the privilege against self-incrimination
embodied in the fifth amendment. On the contrary, it embraces any and
all privileges that the witness may invoke under the applicable law,
including not only privileges recognized by American rules of evidence,
but also privileges recognized by foreign law that, under the applicable
American conflict of laws rule, the witness may properly invoke.141
Conflicts of law is one of many ways in which U.S. courts in foreign
discovery and § 1782 cases need to explore foreign law.1 42 Understanding
that U.S. courts must increasingly engage with foreign legal analysis
despite the risks and pitfalls that Smit correctly signaled, Judge Friendly
looked to comparative legal scholarship in In re Letters Rogatory to make
a subtle and apposite conclusion about French law.1 43 He consulted legal
scholarship on French law that appeared in the American Journal of
ComparativeLaw.1 44 The case exemplifies how U.S. courts might be able
to embrace foreign legal analysis.
Once Judge Friendly studied the French legal institution at issue in
his case and reached a conclusion about its effect on the discovery issue
he was adjudicating, his finding about French law became incorporated
into law by precedent, and was followed in a later case in the same

(1994).
138.

"A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to produce a

&

document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege." 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1964).
139. The case was Application of Sarrio, S.A., 119 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 1997). Professor Smit's
critique is in Smit, supra note 93, at 10-11, 14.
140. Sarrio, 119 F.3d at 143.
141. Smit, supra note 136, at 1033.
142. On the importance of comparative law to conflict of laws analysis, see Ralf Michaels
Christopher Whytock, Internationalizingthe New Conflict of*Laws Restatement, 27 DUKE J. COMP.

& INT'L L. 349, 356-58 (2017).
143. See In re Letters Rogatory Issued by Director of Inspection of Government of India, 385
F.2d 1017 (1967).
144. Id. The case was criticized by Hans Smit for reasons other than Justice Friendly's account
of French law or understanding of comparative legal analysis. See Smit, supra note 93, at 14.
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jurisdiction which duly cited to In re Letters Rogatory 's finding. 145 Judge
Friendly's idea of consulting scholarship rather than party experts with
respect to foreign law is fully supported by Federal Rule 44.1, allowing
judges to gain their understanding of foreign law broadly: "In determining
foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or source,
including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence."1 4 6 It is a rare court which initiates
its own foray into comparative legal scholarship, however much courts
may be skeptical of party experts' testimony concerning the proper
interpretation of foreign law.1 47 Judge Friendly's exploration of
comparative law meant that he understood the determinative way in which
the French juge d'instructionshould not be deemed equivalent to a judge
in the U.S. sense of the term, and how the French institution of
"instruction" should satisfy § 1782's requirement of a "tribunal," despite
apparent differences with the U.S. system which might have led to the
opposite conclusion on the part of a U.S. lawyer or judge who was less
well informed. 148
The Seventh Circuit's more recent idea of replacing the paid party
expert's testimony with the judge's reading foreign law in translation
could yield just the sort of unfortunate slips and falls that Smit and Justice
Ginsburg feared to the extent that courts might feel able to read
translations independently of explanatory commentary and scholarship.
These slips and falls, however, will be avoidable if the judge is apprised
of the necessity of secondary literature, to which the Seventh Circuit
referred:
French law, and the law of most other nations that engage in extensive
international commerce, is widely available in English. Judges can use
not only accepted (sometimes official) translations of statutes and
decisions but also ample secondary literature, such as treatises and
scholarly commentary. It is no more necessary to resort to expert
declarations about the law of France than about the law of Louisiana,
which had its origins in the French civil code, or the law of Puerto Rico,
whose origins are in the Spanish civil code. No federal judge would
admit "expert" declarations about the meaning of Louisiana law in a

145. See In re Letter of Request from the Gov't of France, 139 F.R.D. 588, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
146. FED.R.CIv.P.44.1.
147. For a court so skeptical that it suggested dispensing with experts in favor of reading the
translated texts of foreign legislation, see Bodurn USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624 (7th
Cir. 2010).
148.

See In re Letters Rogatory, 385 F.2d at 1017.
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commercial case. 149
Judge Friendly's comparative law initiative has not been followed, at least
not openly, in light of the Supreme Court opinion in Intel that dealt with
the issue of U.S. courts' interface with foreign law.1 50 Yet the cases show
that determinations of foreign law are made on a continuing and
increasing basis. It is to be hoped that comity's increased presence in U.S.
decision-making will also be a harbinger of comparative legal analysis
and the willingness to examine foreign law openly and advisedly.
C

Recent Case Law
1. Document Location and Origin

In 2016, the Eleventh Circuit held that documents located outside the
United States came within the purview of the court's § 1782 powers,
pointing out in Sergeeva v. Templeton International, Ltd.' 5 that under
Federal Rule 45, those documents would be produced in the United States.
The court thus held that this was a case of "domestic" discovery, rejecting
the respondent's extraterritoriality argument. The court further held that
control over the information requested was the "legal right to obtain" such
information.1 52 Sergeeva was a divorce case, an area in which § 1782
petitions arise frequently. 153
Conversely, in In re Application of RSM Prod. Corp. v. Noble
Energy, the court denied a § 1782 petition with respect to documents
located outside of the United States for use in an Israeli court proceeding
where granting the petition would have required the court to pierce the
corporate veil of the foreign subsidiary. 154 The court reached this
conclusion despite the apparently uncontested argument that Israel's
courts are generally receptive to discovery from the United States.' 55 The
"body of caselaw suggest[s] that § 1782 is not properly used to seek
documents held outside the United States" by foreign subsidiaries.1 56 The
Texas district court engaged in a comparative legal examination of Israel's
discovery laws, concluding that the information sought would not be
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
2016)
155.
156.

Bodum, 621 F.3d at 628-29.
See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 542 U.S. 241, 243 (2004).
834 F.3d 1194, 1200 (11 th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1201.
See id. at 1199, n.4.
In re Application of RSM Prod. Corp. v. Noble Energy, 195 F. Supp. 3d 899 (S.D. Tex.
See id. at 903-04.
Id. at 904.
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discoverable there, and attributing some weight to that factor, linking it to
the petitioner's attempt to profit from U.S. discovery.1 7 The court did not
go so far as to find that this amounted to trying to "circumvent" the law
of the foreign country, one of the Intel factors.
2. Proceedings Predating Complaints
In Mees v. Buitter,'59 the issue arose as to whether § 1782's
requirement that the discovery be "for use" in a foreign proceeding was
met where the party seeking it had not yet filed a complaint. The Second
Circuit reversed the district court's decision that the petition could not be
granted, holding that the statutory requirement is met so long as "the
proceeding is within reasonable contemplation." 60 The Supreme Court
previously had addressed this issue in Intel, where it had specifically
stated that a foreign proceeding need not be either "pending" or even
"imminent,"' 6 1 for a U.S. court to grant a § 1782 petition. It also held that
the applicant might win her § 1782 petition even if the discovery sought
"was not necessary for her to succeed in the foreign proceeding."' 6 2
In keeping with Mees, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted a § 1782 petition in 2017 to the plaintiff in In re
Kiobel, 63
' who intended to bring an action in the Netherlands similar to
the one she had lost in the U.S. Supreme Court against Royal Dutch Shell,
a Dutch company. Petitioner Kiobel sought documents and other materials
from the law firm that had represented Shell in the U.S. case, Cravath,
Swaine & Moore, LLP, for information relating to the U.S. case as well as
to some related U.S. cases,164 all of which had been brought under the
Alien Tort Statute.' 65 The U.S. Kiobel case had been dismissed in 2013
for failure to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality and failure
to demonstrate a sufficient nexus with the United States. 166
The Southern District of New York signaled in its § 1782 decision
that Kiobel's request was not premature because she had demonstrated
her intent to bring an action concretely by:

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 906.
See id.
Mees v. Buiter, 793 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 295.
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 542 U.S. 241, 259 (2004).
Id.
In re Kiobel, 16 Civ. 7992 (AKH), 2017 WL 354183 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2017).
See id. at *1-2.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
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(1) draft[ing] a writ of summons, which is the initiating summons in
Dutch proceedings; (2) appl[ying] for and obtain[ing] legal aid on behalf
of Kiobel from the Dutch Legal Aid Board, which required a show that
meaningful legal steps had been taken to prepare for the action; and (3)
sen[ding] "liability letters" to Shell, which had the effect of tolling the
statute of limitations.16 7

The court also noted, in the inevitable foray into comparative law that §
1782 requires of U.S. courts, that Dutch law demands "a certain amount
of evidence" at the outset, before litigation can begin.168
In In re an OrderPursuantto 28 U. S. C. § 1782 to Conduct Discovery
169
for Use in a Foreign Proceeding,
the District Court for the District of
Columbia confirmed that the legal standard for a petitioner to meet §
1782's "for use" in a foreign proceeding requirement is not exigent. 170
7
The petitioners in Hulley"'
represented Rosneft, the Russian state-owned
company, in connection with a suit against the Russian Federation
concerning an international arbitration award to Yukos, the Russian oil
and gas company once run by Khodorkovsky before his imprisonment.1 72
Subsequently, Yukos won the largest international arbitration award in

history ($50 billion). 171
In this case, the court nevertheless denied the petition for Federal
Rules discovery where it concluded that discovery would be of debatable
relevance to the foreign proceeding and be likely to cause further
litigation. It thus weighed the importance of the discovery to the case
against the burdens such discovery would create and found that the
burdens outweighed the relatively weak potential significance of the
information sought.1 74
167. Kiobel, 2017 WL 354183, at *2-3.
168. Id. at *3.
169. In re an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to Conduct Discovery for Use in a Foreign
Proceeding, Misc. Case No. 17-1466 (BAH), 2017 WL 3708028 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2017)
(reconsideration denied).
170. Id.at*10.
171. Hulley Enters. v. Russian Fed'n, 211 F. Supp. 3d 269, 272-73 (D.D.C. 2016) was the In re
an Order Pursuantcourt's Memorandum Opinion granting the same three petitioners' motion for a
stay of their related pending lawsuit to confirm the arbitration awards. See In re an Order Pursuant,

2017 WL 3708028 at *1.
172. See In re an Order Pursuant, 2017 WL 3708028 at *4-5; Yukos shareholders $50 billion
win is largest arbitration award ever: GML director, REUTER (July 28, 2014, 5:11 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-yukos-gml/yukos-shareholders-50-billion-win-is-largest-

arbitration-award-ever-gm-director-idUSKBNOFXOO620140728 [https://perma.cc/LH3C-UAXA].
173. In re an Order Pursuant, 2017 WL 3708028, at *4-5. While the respondent in Hulley
represented Rosneft, apparently it previously had served as legal counsel for the Russian Federation.
Id.
174. Id.at*13.
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Finally, in Andover Healthcare, Inc. v. 3M Co.,' 5 the Eighth Circuit
referred to the Intel criterion of party versus non-party petitioner,
reasoning that where revealing trade secrets could have caused grave harm
to the respondent, and the petitioner was a party to the litigation, the
petitioner could seek authorization as a party to the action in the foreign
proceeding for the discovery it sought."' In that case, the district court
had concluded that "the highly sensitive nature of the requested discovery,
and the lack of certainty that confidentiality [could] be maintained,
weighed heavily against ordering discovery."' 7 7 This case is consistent
with the recent tendency to evaluate the concerns of the foreign party and
nation with increasing consideration.
IV. TRANSNATIONAL DIGITAL DATA DISCOVERY AND THE NEED FOR A
NEW UNDERSTANDING OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY

A new dimension to discovery issues has entered with modern
technology and in particular with the digital storage of data. This section
explores the new challenge. Foreign blocking statutes figure in a new and
often confusing manner in the area of U.S. discovery with respect to
information stored in the cloud. Digital data cases are becoming more
frequent and have injected new issues into traditional discovery inquiries.
The difficulty they pose is in applying existing legal criteria that were
developed over centuries on the basis that national law is territorial, to
cases which epitomize the deterritorialization that the Internet creates
wherever it reaches.
Under stare decisis, courts are bound by well-established laws of
jurisdiction that are intertwined with discovery and blocking statute
analysis and that all have as their point of departure two basic principles:
(1) a court's jurisdiction is bounded by geographical territory;178 and (2)
in international law each nation's legal rights are limited to its national
territory.' 79 Superimposed on this is the U.S. presumption against the
extraterritorial application of national law. This presumption, on the one
hand, is part and parcel of international law. ' On the other hand, it is part
of a trend towards greater respect for international comity. The

175.
176.
177.
178.
(1999).

817 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 623 (citing Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004)).
Id. at 623-24.
See Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICi. L. REV. 843

179.

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (7th ed. 2008).

180.

See id. at 311-12.
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presumption has been subject to varying interpretations in U.S. law at
different times.'
In dealing with unexpected scientific developments, the law has
always had to find its way, whatever the area. In 2018, revisions of the
Uniform Parentage Act provided for the first time for the possibility of
more than two parents per child because of the biomedical research that
created surrogacy and new modes of fertility.' 82 The Uniform Probate
Code seems on the cusp of similar revisions."' Judicial perspectives
developed a great deal from the days of the first surrogacy case of Baby
M, when a New Jersey state court applied a brew of mainly contract law
principles, along with adoption and constitutional law analysis, because
of the dearth of available laws better suited to the novel issue which
biomedical innovations of the time were causing it to adjudicate.' 84
Similarly, one possibility for cloud-stored data is to try to adapt illfitting laws of a bygone time that speak to site of location, while another
is to create new laws. As this Article was being written, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., a case that brought the cloud into
confrontation with a foreign blocking statute,' while Congress had
proposed a new law, now enacted, to regulate the matter, known as the
CLOUD Act. 186 Courts traditionally have shown a preference for
legislatures to act in their place where innovations in the law are called
for. In this case, § 103(a)(1) of the CLOUD Act specifically includes, as
part of a service provider's obligations under the Stored Communications
Act (SCA), the disclosure of information "located within or outside of the
United States."' The issue of extraterritoriality had thus become moot.
After the legislation was signed into law, the government obtained another
warrant against Microsoft under the SCA.' The Supreme Court held that
the case before it was moot and vacated the lower court holdings.' 89

&

181.
In the mid-twentieth century, the presumption against extraterritoriality had weakened so
much that the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law no longer mentioned it. See William S.
Dodge, Understandingthe Presumptionagainst Extraterritoriality,16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 86.
See also id. at 85-86 for relevant case law. Today the pendulum has swung back. See Kimmelman

Smith, supra note 1; Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
182.

Uniform Parentage Act (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017).

183. These revisions to the UPC are being undertaken by the Uniform Law Commission's Joint
Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts. Email from Prof. Tom Gallanis, Subcomm. on
U.P.C. Rev. to Vivian Grosswald Curran (Jan. 31, 2018) (on file with author).
184. Matter of Baby M., 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. 1987).
185. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
186. See id.
187. Id. at 1888 (emphasis added).
188. Id.
189. Id.

2017]

DISCOVERY IN A TRANSNATIONAL AND DIGITAL AGE

883

What the legislation does not address is the non-localizable nature of
data. It is this characteristic that case law also has not yet addressed, with
the exception of the appellate court's concurrence in Microsoft.190
Microsoft, like most of the digital data cases, involved both a foreign
blocking statute and a U.S. statute, here the SCA.' 91 The SCA authorizes
searches and seizures of email accounts stored on the web.1 92 Microsoft
had been held in contempt of court when it refused to make disclosures in
satisfaction of a government warrant issued under this law with respect to
a client suspected of criminal conduct. 193 Microsoft disclosed information
it said was stored in the United States, but refused to disclose other
information requested, which it said was on a server based in Ireland. 194
The majority defined a server as "a shared computer on a network
that provides services to clients," 95 and an Internet-connected server as a
"common example of a server." 96 The majority proceeded to explore the
SCA's legislative history, concluding that its purpose was to extend
Fourth Amendment privacy protections to, among others, email account
holders.197
The next step for the majority was to invoke the presumption against
extraterritoriality in U.S. statutes, a natural approach since the case arose
under a statute and also since Microsoft had posed its objections to
discovery in terms of the territoriality of the server (i.e., its location in
Ireland) in keeping with digital data case precedents.198 The court found
that the statutory terms permitting searches and seizures, including
amendments, were all limited to the national territory of the United
States 99 and that the statute's principal purpose was to protect the privacy
of users.2 00 It concluded that the government had not rebutted the

190. Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corporation, 829 F.3d 197, 222-32 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring), vacated and
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
191 Microsoft, 138 S. Ct. at 1186.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1187.
194. Matter of Warrant,829 F.3d at 200.
195. Id.
196.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

197. See id. at 205.
198. See id. at 209 (citing RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 179 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) and other
U.S. Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases dealing with the presumption, and following the
analytical approach in presumption against extraterritorial application cases outlined in Morrison v.

Nat'] Austi. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261-65 (2010)).
199. Matter of Warrant, 829 F.3d. at 213.
200. Id. at 219.
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presumption against extraterritoriality. In the government's appeal to the
Supreme Court, the issue of whether there is territorywas not raised.
The Second Circuit's concurring opinion addressed the novel issues
the majority had not discussed: "What searches are unreasonable is ... a
difficult question . .. when courts are assessing statutory authorizations of
novel types of searches to deal with novel types of threats."20 1 The
concurring opinion sized up the problem as being not one primarily of
privacy, but as the "[tiricky [issue], in a world of transnational
transactions taking place in multiple jurisdictionsat once, [of] deciding
whether a proposed application of a statute is domestic or
202

extraterritorial."

In Microsoft, it would have been uncontested that the government's
right to search and seize would not have permitted it to enter Ireland, 20 3
but, given the nature of the information sought in this case, the
government argued that it had a right to the contested data to the extent
that Microsoft had access to it. 2 04 The government's argument had a basis
in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442(l)(a): "A court
or agency in the United States, when authorized by statute or rule of court,
may authorize a person subject to its jurisdiction to produce documents,
objects or other information ... even if the information or the person in
possession of the information is outside the United States." Moreover, in
this case, Microsoft could access the documents from the United States.
This analysis derives from the premise that the information was
tangible, however. Judge Lynch articulated the current dilemma in
applying a law of physically embodied information as follows:
Electronic "documents". . . are different. Their location on a computer
server in a foreign country is, in important ways, merely virtual . .. the
very idea of online data being located in a physical 'place' is becoming
rapidly outdated, because computer files can be fragmented and
dispersed across many servers. Corporate employees in the United
States can review these records, when responding to the "warrant" or
subpoena or court order just as they can do in the ordinary course of
business . . . without ever leaving their desks in the United States.

205

201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 225 (Lynch, J., concurring).
Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
See id. at 227.
See id.

205.

Id. at 229 (quoting in part Orin S. Kerr, The Next GenerationCommunications PrivacyAct,

162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 408 (2014)).
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The cloud thus casts a new light on the U.S. legal concept of
extraterritoriality by virtue of making "location . . virtual" 20 6 and by
allowing data to be simultaneously accessed in many different places.
Concepts of court jurisdiction and of transnational discovery arose before
the advent of the Internet. The same is true for the statutes under which
the digital data cases of the last years have been arising. Judge Lynch at
least implicitly suggested in Microsoft that a relevant inquiry is if
Congress, when enacting the SCA, "gave any thought at all to potential
transnational applications of the statute."20 7
In 2017, a year after the Second Circuit held that Microsoft could not
be forced to disclose information under the SCA, the District Court for
the Central District of California held that Google could be compelled to
do so pursuant to the same statute. 208 Looking to five other cases involving
Google, and distinguishing Microsoft on the facts, the court held that no
invasion of privacy occurs before data is disclosed in the United States.209
The court noted that Google transmitted data in an automated manner,
based on algorithms and unrelated to any actions taken by account
holders.210
Microsoft, on the other hand, stores its data according to country
codes its account holders indicate. 2 11 The court noted another contrast in
that, unlike Microsoft's counterparts, Google's automatic and frequent
data transmissions take no account of the various blocking laws of the
countries in which their data may, often fleetingly, be located at any given
point.212

The court noted that the Second Circuit's majority Microsoft opinion
had been rejected by subsequent courts which had considered the issue,
as well as by dissenting justices, particularly in its finding that the SCA
would be applied extraterritorially were it to be applied, because the
information requested was located in Ireland, 213 despite the fact that
Microsoft could access the information from the United States.
In the view of this court, as well as of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in In re Search Warrant,214 "the fluid nature of the cloud
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
2017).
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Id. at 231.
In re Search of Info. Assoc. with Accts., 268 F. Supp. 3d 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2017).
Id. at I (citing to the five Google precedents, at id. n. 1).
See id.
Id.at2.
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Id. at 4-5.
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makes it uncertain whether a foreign state's sovereignty or which foreign
state's sovereignty is implicated." 215 The court also evoked the Eastern
District of Wisconsin in which the district court in In re Information
associatedwith one Yahoo21 6 held that the location of the service provider
is the location of interest with respect to determining the court's
jurisdiction, which then can compel disclosure of any information the
service provider possesses or controls.2 17 These and other cases, with the
exception of Microsoft, all have held that the application of the SCA was
domestic, not extraterritorial. In those cases, as the courts have noted,
unlike in Microsoft, the account holders did not know where their data
was stored.218
In ordering that Google be compelled to disclose the information the
government sought pursuant to the SCA, the court held as follows:
No human hand in a foreign country is involved. No one goes to a
foreign country to retrieve data. All of the actions Google described are
within its authority under § 271(c)(1) and its user agreement. There is
no "seizure" of data, as if from someone else in a location it does not
control. Google has complete discretion to move data around the globe
and does so on a regular basis, irrespective of foreign blocking statutes.
It cannot seize data already within its possession, custody and control.219
This reasoning does not distinguish between the power of the Internet
provider which through automated algorithms sends data on the cloud and
the reach of an American domestic law statute. When speaking of the
cloud, territorial terms may be inapposite, such that "everywhere" might
be a less apt representation than "infinite." Should the SCA's reach
become infinite by virtue substantially of the accessibility Google has to
data stored on the cloud from its U.S. offices? If not, should the cloud
provide criminals an escape route that will elude the SCA? Meanwhile,
what does seem certain is that the courts will need to continue to grapple
with how the concept of territoriality and data are to be understood
together. 220

215. In reSearch of/nfb., 268 F. Supp. 3dat 6.
216. In re Info. assoc. with one Yahoo email address that is stored at premises controlled by
Yahoo, Nos. 17-M-1234, 17-M-1235, 2017 WL 706307, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 21, 2017).
217. Id.
218. In re Search of Infb., 268 F. Supp. 3d at 8.
219. Id.
220. For scholarship in this area, see Kerr, supra note 205; Jennifer Daskal, The UnTerritorialityof Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326 (2015).
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V. CONCLUSION

Edward Levi once described the process of the common law as
society's needs impelling lawyers to knock at the doors of the courts to
make an argument repeatedly unsuccessful until a dissenting opinion
finally embraces that viewpoint contrary to prevailing legal authority, and,
at an ulterior stage, fortified by the support of the respected dissenting
justice, the same position eventually becomes the majority rule.221 The
need for open and fruitful comparative judicial legal engagement is one
such societal need for law in the transnational era. Judge Friendly
illuminated the path.
U.S. judges, like their colleagues across the world, necessarily must
draw conclusions about foreign law at rates never seen before. It would
be preferable for U.S. courts to do so with the tools of comparative legal
scholarship in that area, and perhaps with court-appointed experts in
foreign law, as the courts in European countries have been doing for many
years.222 While law's globalization demands comparative legal work,
globalization itself also requires interdisciplinary work.223 In particular,
the digitalization of data requires legal concepts that are better adapted to
the Internet's almost total deterritorialization of law, a field that already
is experiencing deterritorialization through many factors in the modem
age. But, after all, this story is the story of law itself, for, as one scholar
has put it, "the history of law is no more than [that of] its
transformations."2 24

221.
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Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1948).
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223. Or, as Frydman puts it, a "transdisciplinary approach." See Frydman, supra note 11, at 14.
224. Id. at 9.

